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Socf81 psychol~og2s.t~. s.ince H:ej:de~' C19581 h,Ve jmimqr$lp concentrated on two 
. . 
areas. of experimentat2on velated' to. respons5bi-litp: exploratfon of Heider's 
. . . .  - - . .  
developmental s.tages.'An ~es$onsi'6%15tp attrrbutfon (e.g., Shaw and Sulzer, 
1964; Sulzer, 1971); and assessment of responsibilftp attrfbuted for an 
. . . . . - 
acctdental occurrence (e.g. Walster, 1966; Shaver, 1970). Yet certain 
recent historical occurrences suggest that our theoretical framework may 
be tnadequate: that we may not fully apprecrate what responsibility itself 
nleans, how the presence of authorfty can alter perceived responsibility, or 
how the self and society interact to produce actions motivated by obligation 
rather than personal desire. The present paper examines the legal and social 
psychological literatures on these three topics -- each of which presents 
potential paradoxes in responsib2lity attribution -- to show where more care- 
ful theoretical formulation may be needed. 
Attribution - of responsibility &psychology -- and law 
What does responsibility mean? Recent events have helped to in- 
dicate that the meaning is not entirely clear. For example, one of the 
ironies discovered by the American people during the Watergate era was 
that, as one wit put it, our President was trying to take the "respon- 
sibility, but not the blame" for the scandal. This remark raises the 
first possible paradox for our theories: Is saying that someone has 
responsibility but not blame like saying that someone is a married 
bachelor? Or does it make linguistic and theoretical sense to talk about 
I 
the separation of responsibility from blame? Thus Watergate raises 
sharply the basic question of the meaning of responsibility itself. 
Xn our usual understand+ng of the term responsibility, a judgment of 
-3 -. 
res$ons ib%lf  ty  requixes. '  an a c t o r ,  a ~ L s d e e d ' ,  and a n  observer'. Such a 
. . .  . .  . . . 
judgment $s a n  assessment  ,. a f t e r .  an  ' ac tPon,  of who' i s  t o .  be '  blamed o r  
- - 
punfsheil' f o r  i t .  The judgment can be' made by  t h e  a c t o r  h imse l f ,  a c t i n g  
as. a s e l f - o b s e r v e r ;  more o f t e n ,  i t  is made by o t h e r s ,  a c t i n g  a s  h i s  
. .  . .  
judges. T h e ' a c t i o n  f o r  which o n e - i s  r e s p o n s i b l e  is  generaLly thought 
t o  have two components: i n t e n t  on t h e  p a r t  of t h e  a c t o r  and negat ive  
consequences . to  another .  S o c i a l  psychologica l  d i s c u s s i o n s  of t h i s  r e -  
s p o n s i b i l i t y  a t t r i b u t i o n  have focused on t h e  i s s u e s  of perceived locus  
of c a u s a l i t y  and consequences of a c t i o n .  Locus of c a u s a l i t y  r e f e r s  t o  
a dz.chotomy between i n t e r n a l  and e x t e r n a l  causes:  a n  intended a c t i o n  is 
perceived as i n t e r n a l l y  caused; a c t i o n s  whose cause i s  e x t e r n a l  t o  t h e  
person,  i n  c o n t r a s t ,  do not  render  him respons ib l e .  The law, however, 
o f f e r s  some i n t e r e s t i n g  modi f ica t ions  t o  t h i s  approach, bo th  i n  terms 
of the i n t e r p l a y  between i n t e n t  and consequence and i n  terms of t h e  
d e f i n i t i o n  of responsibi1ilt .y i t s e l f .  W e  s h a l l  t h u s  begin  by d i scuss ing  
no t ions  o£ r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  he ld  i n  c r i m i n a l  law .and l e g a l  theory ,  r e l a t i n g  
t h e  s o c i a l  psychologica l  approaches t o  t h e  l e g a l  ones.  
I n  modern c r i m i n a l  law, a crime h a s  two elements:  a c t u s  r eus  and --
mens rea--"guilty a c t "  and " g u i l t y  mind." A s  a r e c e n t  w r i t e r  on t h e  -- 
s u b j e c t  has  de f ined  i t ,  mens r e a  i s  --
A term meaning a g u i l t y  i n t e n t  and commonly used only  i n  connect ion 
w i t h  t h e  maxim "ac tus  non f a c i t  reum n i s i  mens sit rea." ... The maxim --------- 
- '  may b e  t r a n s l a t e d  as: "Ari - a c t  does .not make.*a*.man guiilty-;.unless 
h i s  i n t e n t i o n s  a r e  bad." (Biggs, 1955, p. 208) 
Thus-bad consequences a r e  no t  t h e  s o l e  c r i t e r i o n  f o r  l e g a l  g u i l t ;  t h e o r e t i c a l l y p  
.- . .- - - . , -  , ---  ->;. . . . -  
i n t e n t i o n  is  c e n t r a l  t o  f u l l .  c r imina l  r e s p o n s i b i l i t y .  Y e t  j u s t  what t h i s  
i n t e n t i o n  means is  a thorny  i s s u e  f o r  b o t h  psychology and law. 
'gos t  modern cont roversy  over mens r e a  has  a r i s e n  over  t h e  i n s a n i t y  --
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defense. vodepn Anglo-&ner$cqn law clearly. nequk~es both I'guRlty act" 
and "guf lty. m&ndi' for conv2ct&n rh ser&u& c~ixnes'; yet' tRe. law's 
. . 
crftezfa for guflty. m2nd fall shoataof reflectrng modern psychology's 
views of mental. dtsorders. En most'Amerfcan jur2sdict2onsY the "MINaghten 
rule" is still followed. Named after a celebrated case from Victorian 
England (1843J, the rule specEfSes that a defendant must, first, not know 
the nature and quality of what he 2s dohg; or, second, if he does 
bow, not know that what he is doing is wrong. By wrong, the original 
formulators of these rules clearly meant morally wrong. Thus secular 
"legal" and "3llegal" are d2rectly linked to moral-religious "right" and 
The cructal element fn our modern legal definition of mens rea --, 
then, is knowledge of right and wrong. Children and the obviously re- 
tarded or insane are presumed to lack the capacity for mens rea or to --9  
lack understanding of the distinction between right and wrong. Otherwise, 
normal indivtduals are presumed to know right from wrong; they are pre- 
sumed to know the law; and they are presumed to intend to do what they do. 
In contrast to this morally-toned rule in theory, inference of 
intention in law is operationalized with very little of a flavor of malice, 
evil, or wrong intention. As Hart (1968) has noted, in criminal law intention 
is operationally defined in law as foreseeing - the consequences -- of one's 
actions. In other words, a person's goal -- what he wants to do, or what 
we would usually say he intends to do -- may be one thing, "X." Another 
event, "Y," may be but a foreseen side effect, perhaps an unwanted one. 
Nevertheless, a person may be held accountable if an illegal "Y" was a 
foreseen outcome of his act2ons. For example, an unwanted (but foreseen) 
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death can justify conviction for premeditated murder. Further, foreseea- 
bility is implicitly defined in terms of what a "reasonable man" would 
assume or expect to be the consequences of an action. Thus mens rea --9 
often conceptualized in terms of malice, evil, or intent to do wrong, 
is operationalized in less moralistic and more probabilistic terms. 
Further, presumed intention and consequence are not independent of 
one another. A person who has committed an action is presumed to 
have been able to foresee its consequences; and he has acted with 
"guilty mind" if among these consequences is illegal ha& to others. 
To some extent, it is up to the individual who has done the deed to 
demonstrate that he did not want the effect, did not intend the effect, 
and did not foresee the effect of his actions--and that he acted as 
would any reasonable man under the circumstances. Thus - outcomes --.-doplinate -. . . 
... . . 
intentions: what we do, .we are presumed to do knowingly. . --. - ---  
There are obvious similarities between the actual operationalization 
of -- mens rea in law and attrrbution theory approaches to responsibility 
by social psychologists. Heider's (1958) discussion of responsibility 
attribution has provided the basic framework for current conceptualizations 
of responsebility in this literature. 
First, Heider (1958) provides a general attribution framework: the 
11 naive analysis of action" by individuals. According to Heider, people 
want to make the world a stable and predictable place. Consequently, 
they try to understand both what is stable in the environment ("dis- 
positional qualities" of objects) and what causes changes in that environ- 
ment. According to Heider, people analyze causes of actions into two 
categories: forces from the environment and forces from people acting in 
the environment. Personal force is a combination of ability and trying-- 
what a person is able .- to do, plus both what he tries to do and how hard 
, . --
he tries. ~eider's concept of "can" includes what a person is able to 
do, taking the difficulty of the environment into consideration. Thus, 
when we say that an action was personally or intentionally caused, we 
mean that the action was both something a person could do under the 
circumstances and something he tried to do. Such personal ca.u~gl.itY, 
in   eider's view, is a necessary condition for responsibility to be 
attributed to a person by an adult. 
Heider does not actually specify what he means by responsibility. 
Tnstead, he essentially defines it by exclusion: 
Tt has already been stressed that intention is the central factor 
$.n personal causality ... People are held responsible for their in- 
tentions and exertions but not as strictly for their abilities... 
Personal responsibility ... varies with the relative contribution 
of environmental factors to the action outcome; in general, the 
more they are felt to influence the action, the less the person 
is held responsible (1958, pp. 112-113). 
Heider seems to be referring to general liability to be blamed or pun- 
ished when he discusses responsibility. Two factors appear to be central 
in determining when a person is responsible: the extent to which he 
intended, or personally caused, the effect; and the extent to which 
the action was caused by environmental forces or pressures. 
Heider also briefly discusses.five levels or stages in the develop- 
ment of responsibility attribution in the child, following a Piagetian 
general framework (Piaget, 1965). We shall summarize these stages 
using labels applied by Sulzer (1971): 
Stage One:' Association. A person is "held responsible for each 
effect that is in any way connected with him or that seems in any way 
to belong to him" (Heider , 1958, p. 113) . 
Stage Two: Causality. Anything "caused by [a person] E is ascribed 
to him. Causation is understood in the sense that 2 was a necessary 
condition for the happening, even though he could not have foreseen the 
outcome however cautiously he proceeded ... The person is judged not accord- 
Ang to his intention but according to the actual results of what he 
does" (p. 113). Heider indicates that this stage is what Piaget (1965) 
calls objective responsibility. 
Stage Three: Foreseeability. Here "...p is considered responsible, 
directly or indirectly, for any aftereffect he may have foreseen even 
though it was not a part of his own goal and therefore still not a part 
of the framework of personal causality" (p. 113). 
Stage Four: Intention. At this stage "only what E intended is 
perceived as having its source in him" (p. 113). This stage, according 
to Heider, is what Piaget (1965) calls subjective responsibility. 
Stage Five: Justification. In this final stage "...even the 2's 
own motives are not entirely ascribed to him but are seen as having their 
source in the environment." The "responsibility for the act is at least 
shared by the environment" (p. 114). 
As we have seen, the law operationalizes intentionality partly in 
terms of "foreseeability": people are held responsible to some extent 
for effects they foresee, without necessarily directly intending them 
or wanting them. Severity of punishment, however, may well depend on 
directness of intention (cf. Hart, 1968). In addition, criminal charges 
vary in severity on the basis of intent: negligence can be conceptualized 
as lack of foresight; unpremeditated crime as lack of sustained intention; 
and premeditated crime as fully sustained intention to act with fore- 
sight of the action's consequences. Thus legally and psychologically, 
individuals are held most fully responsible for effects they directly 
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intend to produce. 
Jones and Davis's (1965) hypotheses concerning how people attribute 
causality are perhaps still closer to law than Heider's views, although 
their scheme derives from Heider's. According to their attribution 
model, people assume that others know what effects their (the others') 
actions will produce. Thus Jones and Davis build into their model 
a sort of reasonable man's foresight in people's attributions about 
others. The parallel with legal presumption of foresight is clear. 
People are presumed to intend their actions--and, further, to foresee 
their actions' effects. Thus attribution theorists also stress the 
importance of outcomes in attribution of responsibility. In attri- 
bution theory, as in law, does implies can, and--unusual circumstances 
aside--does implies tried to do. ---
Yet legal theorists also provide insight into possible differences 
. . . . . . . 
2n.IyLnds of responsibility as well as degrees or stages of responsibi- 
lEty attribution. Thus they provide a sophistication lacking in current 
social psychological theorizing about responsibility. To ask about 
meanings or kinds of responsibility can bring us closer to an under- 
standing of the links between responsibility and blame. ' 
There are several other uses of the concept of responsibility, in 
addition to the primary meaning involving liability. It is here that 
we must search for the elusive "responsibility without blame." H.L.A. 
Hart (1968) distinguished three other senses of the term: capacity re- 
sponsibility, causal responsibility, and role responsibility. These 
refer to what a person is able.to do, what he has . done-, .. and what he is 
obligated -- -. - to- - do. 
W e n  we say of a person that he is or was "responsible for his 
11 (om) a c t i o n s ,  r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  connotes capac i ty .  W e  may s t i l l  mean t h a t  
t h e  person i s  not  "answerable" t o  o t h e r s  f o r  t h e  a c t i o n s ,  but w e  a l s o  
imply c e r t a i n  s p e c i f i c  reasons why he  is no t .  A person is not  re-  
sponsib le  f o r  h i s  a c t i o n s  i n  t h i s  sense i f  he  i s  a  young c h i l d ,  a  
mental de fec t ive ,  o r  a  psychotic--or, i n  genera l ,  i f  he does not  a t t a i n  
c e r t a f n  minimal l e v e l s  of reasoning and se l f - con t ro l .  Such capaci ty  
f s  a l s o  t h e  b a s i c  element i n  the  broader l i a b i l i t y  r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  
a l r eady  discussed.  People a r e  not  l i a b l e  f o r  blame o r  punishment unless  
they a r e  a b l e  t o  c o n t r o l  what they do. Legally and moral ly,  "ought" 
h p l i e s  "can": we do not  say t h a t  a  person ought t o  fol low r u l e s  unless  
he can do so ,  and w e  a s s e s s  blame f o r  rule-breaking accordingly. 
The term r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  can a l s o  be used i n  a  pure ly  causal  sense,  
where w e  can rep lace  t h e  words "was respons ib le  for" wi th  the  words 
I I caused" o r  "produced" (Hart,  1968, p. 214). Here t h e  pas t  t ense  i s  
c r u c i a l :  t o  say t h a t  someone i s  responsib le  f o r  something may imply 
e i t h e r  causat ion  o r  blame; i n  c o n t r a s t ,  t o  say  t h a t  someone was 
responsib le  f o r  an occurrence o f t e n  impl ies  causat ion  ins tead  of blame. 
r 
F i n a ~ 1 ~ , . i n ~ ! s p e a k i n g  of a  person's  r e s p o n s i b i l . i t i e s ,  we may simply 
mean h i s  r o l e  ob l iga t ions .  A s  Hart says :  
... whenever a person occupies a  d i s t i n c t i v e  p lace  o r  o f f i c e  i n  a  
s o c i a l  organiza t ion ,  t o  which s p e c i f i c  d u t i e s  a r e  a t tached t o  
provkde f o r  t h e  welfare  of o t h e r s  o r  t o  advance i n  some way 
t h e  aims o r  purposes of the  organiza t ion ,  he is properly s a i d  t o  
be responsib le  f o r  t h e  performance of these  d u t i e s ,  o r  f o r  doing 
what is  necessary t o  f u l f i l l  them (1968, p. 212) 
Thus it- appears t h a t  we could t r a n s l a t e  Pres ident  ~ i x o n ' s  " respons ib i l i ty  
without blame" i n t o  " ro le  r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  without  l i a b i l i t y  r e spons ib i l i ty . "  
However, even a  person's  r o l e  r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  genera l ly  implies accounta- 
b . i l i t y  f o r  wrongdoing o r  negative outcomes. When a  person, by v i r t u e  of 
hYs r o l e ,  is "responsible" f o r  performing c e r t a i n  t a s k s  o r  f o r  overseeing 
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other performances, he must answer to others for any failures. Recipro- 
cally, these others may blame him for those failures. Thus even this 
use of the concept of responsibility does not fully escape the potential 
link to blame. 
To be responsible, then,means to be answerable, and this "answera- 
bility" implies potential blame except in the case of purely causal re- 
sponsibility. To be legally responsible (i.e. liable for punishment) 
generally entails Heiderian personal cwsakity,. Yet Hart's discussion 
of.meanings of responsibility gives us a more refined language with which 
to discuss potential variations in responsibility. In particular, it is 
unclear what the relationship between role responsibility and perceived 
personal causality is. Insofar as a superior in a role hierarchy is 
removed in time and place from the commission of an action he ordered, 
his perceived personal causality should be reduced. Yet insofar as his 
order caused his subordinate's performance of the action, the superior 
seems to represent an external environmental force compelling (and, 
in Heider's terms, justifying) the subordinate's action. Thus can a 
superior be both less responsible and more responsible than his subordi- 
nate for an action he orders? Both Watergate and military crimes such 
as the My Lai massacre offer examples of subordinates claiming that 
11 orders" eliminate responsibility. If the responsibility of a subordi- 
nate is indeed eliminated by superior orders, this has serious implica- 
tions for behavior in the ever-present authority hierarchies of a modern 
society. Thus we shall explore the legal and social scientific litera- 
tures to clarify this second possible paradox in responsibility attribu- 
tion: Is a superior less responsible than his subordinate for an action 
he orders, more responsible, or in some sense both more and less respon- 
sible? 
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Respondeat s u p e r i o r :  Author i ty  - and r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  -- i n  l a w .  
Because law c o d i f i e s  t h e  norms and expec ta t ions  of a s o c i a l  group, 
l e g a l  r u l e s  provide  an  i n d i c a t i o n  of what a s o c i e t y  cons ide r s  permiss ib le  
and what i t  cons ide r s  wrong. For obvious r easons ,  t h e  a r e a  of l a w  i n  
which t h e  g r e a t e s t  a t t e n t i o n  has  been focused on a u t h o r i t i e s  and sub- 
o r d i n a t e s ,  on o r d e r s  and t h e i r  obedience, i s  m i l i t a r y  law. M i l i t a r y  
o rgan iza t ions  have long demanded and r ece ived  unques t ion ing  obedience 
from subord ina t e s  t o  supe r io r s .  However, sanc t ioned  massacres and o the r  
excesses  occu r r ing  over  t h e  c e n t u r i e s  have a l s o  demonstrated t h a t  abso- 
l u t e  obedience t o  a l l  commands can  have t r a g i c  r e s u l t s .  Humanity has  
g radua l ly  moved t o  make t h e s e  r e s u l t s  i l l e g a l  a s  w e l l  a s  t r a g i c .  
Glueck (1944) has  provided a u s e f u l  h i s t o r y  of t h e  development of 
m i l i t a r y  law concerning supe r io r  o rde r s .  I n  a d d i t i o n ,  D ins t e in  (1965) 
has  produced a  t h e o r e t i c a l  i n t e r p r e t a t i o n  and c r i t i q u e  of  t h e  defense  
of s u p e r i o r  o r d e r s  i n  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  law. The d i s c u s s i o n  h e r e  draws on t h e s e  
two sources  f o r  in format ion  concerning t h e  l e g a l l y  most c l ea r - cu t  and well-  
documented examples of i l l e g a l  a c t i o n s  by subord ina t e s  under o rde r s .  
Legal  t heo ry  on t h e  s u b j e c t  of m i l i t a r y  s u p e r i o r  o r d e r s  has  been 
6alanced between two p o s s i b l e  extremes: t h e  d o c t r i n e  t h a t  a  subord ina te  
i s  never  -- - r e s p o n s i b l e  f o r  a c t i o n s  h e  commits under o r d e r s  and t h e  d o c t r i n e  
t h a t  h e  always . -- . is. The former p o s i t i o n  is  t h e  defense  of respondeat  
superior.--the view t h a t  a  s u p e r i o r  o f f i c e r  g iv ing  a n  o r d e r ,  no t  t h e  sub- 
o r d i n a t e  obeying i t ,  is  re spons ib l e  f o r  i t s  l e g a l i t y  and i t s  consequences. 
Many m i l i t a r y  systems have a t  some t i m e  f u l l y  accepted t h e  p r i n c i p l e  of 
' respondeat  supe r io r .  The oppos i t e  view t h a t  a subord ina t e  is  always 
r e s p o n s i b l e  f o r  his a c t i o n s ,  whether o r  n o t  h e  is  under s u p e r i o r  o r d e r s ,  
is t h e  p o s i t i o n  t h e  French have l abe l ed  - les ba ionne t t e s  i n t e l l i g e n t e s  
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( the  i n t e l l i g e n t  bayonets).  Such abso lu te  l i a b i l i t y  has never been 
asse r t ed  i n  m i l i t a r y  law, although modern m i l i t a r y  law i n  I s r a e l  and 
West Germany comes c l o s e s t  t o  t h i s  pos i t ion .  Today, super ior  orders  a s  
an absolute  defense is d i sc red i t ed  i n  t h e  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  community. Most 
nat ions ,  and i n t e r n a t i o n a l  law a s  we l l ,  fol low a  compromise s t ance  ins tead.  
This compromise pos i t ion  is an attempt t o  acknowledge both t h a t  
super ior  o rders  o r d i n a r i l y  must (and ought t o )  be obeyed, and t h a t  i l l e g a l  
o rde rs  should be r e s i s t e d  ins tead.  UndeYordinary circumstances, a  s o l d i e r  
i s  expected i o  obey a l l  orders  and is  punished f o r  disobedience. Even 
i f  an order is i l l e g a l ,  a  s o l d i e r  may s t i l l  be excused f o r  having obeyed 
it .  The s o l d i e r  is  only held cr iminal ly  responsible  under most codes i f  
an  order is "manifestly" i l l e g a l  or  i f  a  "reasonable man" would know i t  
t o  be i l l e g a l .  Fur ther ,  even when he  is held g u i l t y  under these  c r i t e r i a ,  
a s o l d i e r ' s  obedience t o  orders may be allowed a s  a  mi t igat ing circum- 
stance.  Thus t h e  -"compromise" s t i l l  resembles t h e  respondeat super ior  
doc t r ine  f a r  more c lose ly  than an abso lu te  l i a b i l i t y  doct r ine .  The obedient 
s o l d i e r  is s t i l l  protected under law, even f o r  the  commission of i l l e g a l  
a c t s .  
One i s s u e  a r i s e s  about t h i s  p o s i t i o n  taken i n  m i l i t a r y  law: How 
congruent is  i t  wi th  t h e  c i v i l i a n  law w e  have a l ready discussed? How 
does t h e  defense of super ior  o rders  r e l a t e  t o  t h e  concept of mens rea?  -- 
I n  f a c t ,  t h e  m i l i t a r y  defense of super ior  o rders  appears t o  be t h e  only 
complete defense i n  which a  person both claims t o  be f u l l y  normal and 
claims not  t o  be responsible f o r  h i s  ac t ions .  A plea  of self-defense is 
a l s o  a  f u l l  j u s t i f i c a t i o n  f o r  an  otherwise cr iminal  a c t ,  but  such a  plea 
does not  imply non-responsibil i ty f o r  one's ac t ions  i n  the  same way. 
A plea  of duress or  coercion, which may s e e m  t o  resemble- t h e  super ior  
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orders defense more closely, is not a justification releasing a defendant 
from responsibility, but a mitigation reducing that responsibility. There 
is no real civilian analog to the superior orders defense. 
Dinstein (1965) suggests that the superior orders defense--even the 
new weaker defense--can be eliminated altogether from international law. 
It is his view that we can conceptualize the superior orders defense as 
a combination of two ingredients: first, duress; and second, ignorance 
of law or fact. Thus the subordinate is acting under pressure from his 
superior, and acting in ignorance that his orders are illegal. In this 
view the defense of superior orders per se is unnecessary and even con- 
fusing. 
Yet the superior orders defense is more than duress plus ignorance. 
First, neither duress nor ignorance of law taken separately is a legal 
justification for murder,; at most,bthey can be mitigating circumstances. More 
importantly, superior orders as a distinct defense reflects the normal 
legal and moral obligations of the subordinate's role. Military organi- 
zations are certainly power hierarchies: superiors can coerce subordinates. 
But they are also authority hierarchies, where superiors have the right 
to give orders to subordinates. It is the subordinate's duty--one might 
even say his "role responsibility1'--to obey orders. There is a moral 
imperative as well as a coercive force involved. Reciprocally, it is 
normally a superior's obligation--his role responsibility--to be answerable 
for orders he gives. The superior orders defense, hybrid that it is, 
can be said to reflect two facts: that the superior normally has both 
greater power and more information than the subordinate (Dinstein's duress 
and ignorance); and that the subordinate normally has a moral and legal 
duty to obey his superior. 
Thus the defense of superior orders, despite all the abuses of 
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a u t h o r i t y  recorded i n  h i s t o r y ,  has  proved s u r p r i s i n g l y  durable .  It i s  
suggested h e r e  t h a t  i ts  d u r a b i l i t y  r e f l e c t s  i t s  important  functions-- 
f i r s t ,  p r o t e c t i n g  t h e  o rd ina ry  s o l d i e r  from a n  i n t o l e r a b l e  burden of 
weighing and i n t e r p r e t i n g  a l l  h i s  o r d e r s ;  and second, r e f l e c t i n g  t h e  moral 
and l e g a l  o b l i g a t i o n s  he ld  by t h e  s u p e r i o r  and subord ina t e  toward one 
another .  Thus l e g a l l y ,  i t  is c l e a r  that--at  least i n  m i l i t a r y  se t t i ngs - -  
o r d e r s  do d r a s t i c a l l y  reduce t h e  subord ina t e ' s  r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  f o r  h i s  ac- 
t i o n s ,  even today. 
I f  o r d e r s  l a r g e l y  r e l i e v e  t h e  subord ina t e  of r e s p o n s i b i l i t y ,  what 
does t h e  g i v i n g  of t h o s e  o r d e r s  do t o  t h e  s u p e r i o r ' s  r e s p o n s i b i l i t y ?  
To a c q u i t  the subord ina t e  does n o t  n e c e s s a r i l y  imply conv ic t ing  t h e  supe r io r .  
Indeed, t h e  d iminut ion  i n  perceived pe r sona l  c a u s a l i t y  a s  one moves away 
from t h e  "smoking gun" might w e l l  make i t  p o s s i b l e  f o r  bo th  t o  be ac- 
q u i t t e d :  t h e  subord ina t e ,  because of o r d e r s ,  and t h e  s u p e r i o r ,  because 
of p h y s i c a l  d i s t a n c e  from t h e  scene.  
Desp i t e  the d iminut ion  i n  Humean causa l i t y - - i . e . ,  proximity i n  space 
and t ime--mil i tary law has  a t  t imes h e l d  s u p e r i o r s  q u i t e  s t r i c t l y  account- 
a b l e  f o r  subord ina t e s '  a c t i o n s .  I n  f a c t ,  under t h e  broades t  i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s  
of respondeat  s u p e r i o r ,  t h e  a u t h o r i t y  is h e l d  r e s p o n s i b l e  f o r  subord ina tes '  
a c t i o n s  whether o r  n o t  he  a c t u a l l y  ordered  them. The best-known example 
of t h i s  "v i ca r ious  l i a b i l i t y "  d o c t r i n e  i n  r e c e n t  h i s t o r y  w a s  probably t h e  
American c o n v i c t i o n  of Japanese General  Yamashita a t  t h e  end of World War 
I1 f o r  war cr imes committed by h i s  men. Evidence i n d i c a t e d  t h a t  Yamashita 
i e i t h e r  ordered  no r  knew about a t  least most of h i s  men's a c t i o n s ,  s i n c e  
he  had l o s t  communication withmany t roops  nea r  t h e  war ' s  end. Neverthe- 
l e s s ,  he was declared: g u i l t y  of h i s  men's war c r imes ,  based on what could 
be- t e r m e d ' a n  adapted "reasonable man" d o c t r i n e :  a  " r easonab le  super ior"  
has not only the minimal duty to refrain from giving illegal orders, but 
the positive responsibility to oversee his subordinates and restrain any 
. . 
unordered lawbreaking. If'he knew about his men's actions, and in any way 
condoned them, Yamashita was violating the first norm; if he did not know, 
he was violating the second. In the case of General Ya~shita, ignorance 
proved to be a hanging offense. 
Although cynics have since argued that Yamashita suffered chiefly 
because he was the losing side's general rather than because of his real 
responsibility for the crimes, recent events within the U.S. have indicated 
that this expanded respondeat'superior doctrine is not entirely dead-- 
nor is it reserved for the "other side" in military conflicts. Late in 
the Watergate scandal, as impeachment began. to be a topic of discussion, 
many arguments in the popular press concerning President Nixon began to 
resemble,-the old respondeat superior doctrine. Thus it was said that 
if President Nixon knew about what his subordinates were doing during the 
burglary and cover-up period, then he was guilty of criminal offenses 
that would constitute grounds for removal from office. If he did not 
know, then he had failed to exercise a superior's responsibility for know- 
ledge of and control over potential illegal acts by subordinates, and 
hence still deserved to be removed. More simply, as some accounts put 
it, if the first was true he was a l&G$- if the second, he was a fool. 
A full-blown respondeat superior doctrine does not allow an authority 
to be either. 
In terms of theory concerning responsibility attribution, the su- 
perior's responsibility for subordinates' actions seems to fall at least 
partly outside the Heiderian framework. In some cases, certainly, the 
argument could be made that the superior represents an environmental 
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coe rc ive  f o r c e  a c t u a l l y  producing t h e  subord ina t e ' s  a c t i o n s .  I n  many 
c a s e s ,  however, s e v e r a l  f a c t o r s  o p e r a t e  i n  combination t o  reduce t h i s  
c lear -cu t  Heiderian c a u s a l i t y .  F i r s t ,  as a l r e a d y  noted ,  t h e  s u p e r i o r  o f t e n  
is no t  p h y s i c a l l y  a l o c a l  cause:  he  may l e a v e  t h e  scene be fo re  t h e  a c t i o n  
is performed, o r  may communicate h i s  o r d e r s  e n t i r e l y  from a d i s t a n c e .  
Second, p a r t i c u l a r l y  as one moves up a h i e r a r c h y ,  a s u p e r i o r ' s  o r d e r s  may 
b e  of a much more gene ra l  n a t u r e  t han  t h e  a c t i o n s  c a r r i e d  o u t .  For example, 
what is  t h e  causa l  r e l a t i o n s h i p  between a "search and destroy ' '  p o l i c y  and 
a My La i  massacre? I n  t h e  c i v i l i a n  realm, how might a gene ra l  d i r e c t i v e  
t o  keep an  eye on t h e  opposing p a r t y  b e  c a u s a l l y  r e l a t e d  t o  a bu rg la ry  
of t h e i r  headquar te rs?  Thus a s  t h e  " s o c i a l  d i s t ance"  i n  t h e  h i e ra rchy  
between s u p e r i o r  and subord ina t e  i n c r e a s e s ,  t h e  l o g i c a l  connect ion between 
o rde r  and i t s  execut ion  weakens. One must make an  i n c r e a s i n g l y  d i f f i c u l t  
i n d u c t i v e  in fe rence  t h a t  a n  a c t i o n  "y" was a ca r ry ing  ou t  of a broad 
d i r e c t i v e  "Y." A s  this l o g i c a l  connec t ion  weakens, t h e  i n f e r e n c e  t h a t  t h e  
s u p e r i o r  intended t h e  e f f e c t s  ob ta ined  by t h e  subord ina t e ' s  a c t i o n  should 
weaken correspondingly.  Thus t h e  s u p e r i o r  may cease  t o  be a Heiderian 
pe r sona l  cause  b o t h  because h e  is  n o t  a l o c a l  cause  and because he  does 
n o t  c l e a r l y  i n t end  t h e  e f f e c t s .  
To t h i s  w r i t e r ' s  knowledge, t h e r e  h a s  been no sys t ema t i c  exp lo ra t ion  
of t h e s e  a s p e c t s  of a s u p e r i o r ' s  r e s p o n s i b i l i t y .  Milgram (1963, 1965, 
1967, 1973) d i d  f i n d  more behav io ra l  r e s i s t a n c e  t o  an a u t h o r i t y ' s  i l l e g i t i -  
mate o r d e r s  when t h e  a u t h o r i t y  was p h y s i c a l l y  removed from t h e  scene  of 
a c t i o n .  However, Milgram was focus ing  on t h e  subord ina t e  r a t h e r  t han  t h e  
s u p e r i o r  i n  h i s  obedience s t u d i e s .  Furthermore, he  was focus ing  on a c t i o n s  
r a t h e r  than  on perceived r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  f o r  t hose  a c t i o n s .  H i s  r e s u l t s  
d o s u g g e s t  t h a t  t h e  removal of t h e  a u t h o r i t y  reduces a coe rc ive  f o r c e  
leading to obedience, providing at least indirect evidence that the 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
superior~as'local'c~se may be placed into a Heiderian framework as an 
environmental coercive force. 
The second issue of logical inference in a chain of command raises 
broader questions concerning what happens in causal chains. Regardless 
of the issue of level of generality, what happens when X causes Y and 
Y causes Z? Is X seen asc the "true" cause of Z? One study (Brickman, 
Ryan, and Wortman, 1975) has initiated the investigation of causal chains. 
Brickman -- et al. were concerned with responsibility attributed for an 
accident, and hence their findings may or may not be generalizable to 
intended acts. Nevertheless, their results are of at least potential 
relevance to responsibility in the authority hierarchy. Using causes 
designated as internal to the person being evaluated or external (i.e., 
situational), they found that prior causes opposite in type to the im- 
mediate cause generally reversed the effects of the immediate cause. 
Thus irrespective of what the immediate cause was, an external prior 
cause elicited lower attributions of responsibility. However, an in- 
ternal immediate cause still elicited more responsibility attribution 
overall (i.e., there was still a main effect as well as the interaction 
effect). The tendency of perceivers to focus on persons as causes-- 
a basic tenet of attribution approaches since Heider--was supported by 
their further finding that internal causes were seen as more important 
and of greater value in diagnosing why the accident occurred. A final 
result not anticipated by the authors was their finding that immediate . . 
.causes are emphasized in consistently internal causal chains while 
,prior causes are emphasized in consistently external chains. They 
speculate that : 
Xt does make some intuitive sense that for an actor to be seen as 
an effective cause, his.-or her actions should be in close proximity to 
the outcome, while an external force is more likely to be seen as an 
effective cause if it has influenced many intermediate events. 
(Brickman .et -'a1 2 9  1975, p. 1066) 
The Brickman -- et al. approach should be expanded to include non- 
qccidental events before we can generalize with assurance to such 
cases as the military chain of command. Nevertheless, one can speculate 
that, even if a subordinate's action is seen as intended (i.e., internal), it 
can also be seen as motivated by orders (i.e., externally)--and thus re- 
sponsibility can be reduced. If one perceives the chain of command as a 
chain of external causes, then the Brickman et al. findings also support --
placing more responsibility further up in the chain. Still, it is clear 
that much research remains to be done to explore causal chains involving 
intended effects. Furthermore, the authority hierarchy presents the in- 
vestigator with the dual problem of intended effects and inductive inference 
from "y" to "Y." 
Despite the potential relevance of these social psychological notions 
about responsibility, it also appears that, at least legally, the superior's 
responsibility simply is not fully linked to causality per se. Using Hart's 
,(1968) terminology, the superior is to some extent "role responsible" for 
what happens regardless of his causal involvement. Thus, with no causal 
chains in evidence, Yamashita was convicted for what his men had done. 
We may speculate that this extreme role responsibility in the absence of 
causal connection is generally reserved for very high authorities. Otherwise, 
because our attributions and our laws have a Humean bias, we would expect 
role responsibility to be countered by weakened causal responsibility. 
Thus Lt. Galley, the only man convicted for the My Lai massacre, held to 
some extent both role and causal responsibility for what occurred. None 
of h i s  s u p e r i o r s  -- whose r o l e  r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  w a s  c e r t a i n l y  g r e a t e r  -- 
rece ived  c r i m i n a l  p e n a l t i e s .  Thus i t  does  appear  t h a t  a  s u p e r i o r  can 
be  bo th  l e s s  r e spons ib l e ,  i n  a  s t r i c t  c a u s a l  sense ,  and more r e spons ib l e ,  
i n  a r o l e  sense ,  than  h i s  subord ina t e  f o r  t h a t  subord ina t e ' s  a c t i o n s .  
Much r e s e a r c h  remains t o  be  done t o  c l a r i f y  t h e  p o t e n t i a l  i n t e r a c t i o n  
and t r ade -o f f s  between types of r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  i n  t h e  chain of command. 
A f i n a l  problem remains: Given t h a t  a subord ina te  may be 
judged t o  be i n  someHumean sense  more r e spons ib l e  than  h i s  supe r io r  f o r  
fo l lowing  t h a t  s u p e r i o r ' s  i l l e g i t i m a t e  o r d e r s ,  why should he obey? 
Can we b e t t e r  understand such a n  a c t i o n  by conceiving of i t  as a  
"crime of obedience" -- a n  a c t i o n  t h a t ,  a l though blameworthy, was 
done because t h e  a c t o r  f e l t  o b l i g a t e d  t o  do i t ?  Is t h i s  i n  any way 
paradoxica l?  We s h a l l  examine t h e  s u b o r d i n a t e ' s  obedience i n  such a  
s i t u a t i o n  from t h e  s tandpoin t  of bo th  a c t o r  and observer ,  focus ing  
on t h e  i n t e r p l a y  between i n t e n t  and consequence t h a t  occurs  i n  t h i s  
11 wrong" a c t i o n  done f o r  t h e  " r igh t "  reasons .  W e  s h a l l  argue t h a t ,  
f o r  many observers  a s  w e l l  a s  f o r  t h e  a c t o r ,  such a crime i s  a  r a r e  
c a s e  i n  which i n t e n t  dominates consequence. Fu r the r ,  i t  p r e s e n t s  
Heiderian a t t r i b u t i o n  theory  wi th  d i f f i c u l t  i s s u e s  concerning how t o  
handle motives o t h e r  than  h e d o n i s t i c  ones and how t o  d e a l  w i th  
d i f f e r i n g  pe rcep t ions  of t h e  a c t i o n  i t s e l f .  
The "Crime of Obedience": I n t e n t  v e r s u s  Consequence 
One d i f f i c u l t y  f o r  both law and s o c i a l  psychology, d i scussed  
above, is  t h e  meaning of mens r e a :  does  " g u i l t y  mind" mean e v i l ,  -- 
mal ic ious  i n t e n t  o r  does i t  mean f o r e s e e i n g  t h e  i l l e g a l  consequences 
of one ' s  a c t i o n ?  We have noted t h a t  i n  a c t u a l  usage i n t e n t  and 
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consequence are non-independent: intent is operationalized as foreseeing 
the consequences of one's actions. In law as in psychology, we assume 
foresight of consequences under normal circumstances for normal individuals. 
However, what we have termed the "crime of obedience" presents several 
interesting problems for the relationship between -- mens rea and responsibil- 
ity. First, what psychological concomitants of obedience can help to 
elucidate the tremendous power of authorities to order their subordinates? 
What makes a normal individual "not responsible" for his own actions? 
Second, how do individuals weigh the "good" motives of the individual ac- 
'tor An such a situation against negative consequences produced? Third, 
how are those consequences and motives perceived? Do all observers share 
and judge the same social reality? 
A number of writers-agree that, for the actor, a demand from an 
authority is psychologically compelling. Why? Milgram (1967) suggests 
that the obedient subject relinquishes responsibility for the consequences 
of his action to the authority: 
The most common adjustment of thought in the obedient subject is 
merely to see himself as not responsible for his own actions. He 
divests himself of responsibility by attributing all initiative 
to the experimenter, a legitimate authority. He sees himself not 
as a full person acting in a morally accountable way but as the 
agent of an external authority ... Persons under authority perform 
actions that seem to violate standards of conscience, but it would 
not be true to say that a moral sense has really disappeared. 
Instead, it acquires a radically different focus. Once a person , 
has entered an authority system, he does not respond with a moral 
sentiment to the actions he performs. Rather, his moral concern 
now shifts to a consideration of how well or how poorly he is living 
up to the expectations that the authority has of him. (1967, p.6) 
Milgram's description confounds two possible sources of this obedience, 
however: coercion and obligation. As noted in our discussion of - re- 
spondeat superior, an authority is more than an external coercive 
force; authority connotes both power to command and right to command. 
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Given that both.the authority's coercive power and his moral legitimacy 
are in operation when he orders a subordinate, can we simply define both 
of these as Heiderian external forces? If so, both the actor's external 
attribution of causality and an observer's similar one are relatively 
trivial cases of attribution to environmental force. In fact, the 
most detailed.discussion of the psychological concomitants of coercion 
and legitimacy is   eider's (1958) treatment of command and ought. We 
shall argue that his analysis contains weaknesses highlighted by the 
crime of obedience, and that these weaknesses reflect a fundamental flaw 
in the Heiderian approach to internal attributions. 
As discussed above, Heider's "naive analysis of action" paradigm 
divides effects into those caused by the person and those caused by 
the environment, including other persons. Acts caused by the person can 
be intended or unintended; to an adult, a person is normally responsible 
only for acts he both intended and committed. According to Heider, command 
generally removes the responsibility for an action from the person carry- 
ing out the command to the person giving it. It is interesting to note, 
however, that Heider never speaks of authority in discussing command. He 
refers instead to subordinates who receive commands from more powerful 
others. He also cites the dictionary definition of duress as an example 
of how command affects responsibility. Heider indicates that we apply 
what the law would call a "reasonable man" rule in assessing responsibility 
for actions under duress: i-f most people would succumb to the duress, 
we attribute responsibility to the source of the duress; if most people 
would resist, we attribute responsibility to the person who succumbs. 
This discussion of command is clearly focused on coercion. It does not 
take account of commands from an authority, who may have a perceived 
ri.ght - .  to issue commands as well as the power to enforce them. 
. .. 
Heider also fails to examine authority.in discussing'ought, but this 
discussion provides clues about what is missing in his "duress" interpre- 
tation of commands. Heider clearly defines what a moral ought entails: 
As a first approach, the content of "I (or o) ought to do x" may 
be said tofbe fashioned after the idea "som~body wants or k a n d s  
that E (or o) do ~f.,'' In the case of ought, however, it is not 
a particular somebody that is felt to want or command people to 
do x, but some suprapersonal objective order. It may also be ex- 
perienced as a supernatural being who personifies this objective 
order; (p. 219) 
Heider also indicates that the ought force can be so strong that it is 
reacted to as a command: 
I' . . . duty commands:'' The duty of a person is what he "ought to do"; 
if he does not do his duty then he does not act according to the 
wish or command of the impersonal order. (p. 223) 
Thus the ought of duty is an impersonal, moral, and powerful influence 
on the individual. 
There are two interesting features of ought. First, the ought of 
duty is a minimum, not a maximum, requirement.. We.gain full praise from 
others by doing more than it requires, by going "beyond the call of duty." 
Second, we are praised most highly for doing acts that are clearly not 
motivated other than by ought (e.g., by desire for pleasure or for avoi- 
dance of pain.) The most praiseworthy act is one performed purely because 
one "ought" to do it. Further, in the really virtuous person,"" ... the 
ought force is so internalized that its strength and direction may be 
said to be generated from within.. .I1 (p. 232). 
As .Heider has actually defined it, then, a moral ought should be 
viewed as a truly transitional or boundary-crossing force: the internal 
. . . . . . . . . 
manifestation of ari'external impersonal order. Heider hints at this by 
reference to Mead's (1962)."generalized other," the attitude of the 
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community as a whole.' In Mead's developmental psychology, as in Freud's 
(1966), the child internalizes-the demands of the generalized other. 
Conscience represents the moral commands of the community carried within 
the self. To praise a person for acting against his own self interest 
in doing what he ought to do is to praise the control that part of him 
. . 
-(e.g.,..?reudfs superego) has over another part (e.g., . . Freud's id.) Yet 
because Heider's own scheme involves a dichotomous attribution, to self 
or environment, it does not make adequate provision for what Heider 
himself seems to acknowledge in the concept of ought; attribution to 
the environment-in-self. 
Thus what is missing from the Heiderian attribution paradigm is what 
makes us fully human: society acting in us as'well as on us. An extremely 
important category of human acts--those with moral or social obligation 
as their motives--can be said to be the products of society within the self, -- 
at least from the standpoint of Mead or Freud. Indeed, Heider gives us 
examples from "naive psychology" suggesting that we can and do judge that 
a person has acted intentionally--i.e., internally--in response to an 
internalized external imperative. 
Looking at the crime of obedience in more detail can provide us with 
further understanding of the role of ought, precisely because such a 
crime is a product of both coercion and obligation. Despite its weaknesses, 
Heider's discussion of ought and command helps to clarify the interplay 
among motives, consequences, and blame. (For the present, we shall 
ignore intention per se, accepting its operationalization as foresight 
of consequences.) The discussion suggests that we should trichotomize 
motives or sources of action: choice, coercion, and obligation should 
be distinguished. The relationship between consequences and praise or 
blame is ordinarily straightforward: positive consequences merit praise, 
.. ..  
. . 
negative ones blame. The interesting issue is'Gho'deserves - the praise or 
blame when, for example, P has been ordered by 0 to do X. From an observer's 
point of view, (liability) responsibility might be attributed for an 
intended action as follows: 
Response Merited by the 
Intended Action 










or another person commanding him to act (0) is perceived as responsible for the 





simple when a person is perceived to do what he wants to do: he is 
Blame to 
P 
primarilj; 0 . : 
? 
responsible for the action, whether it is praiseworthy or blameworthy. 
When P :acts in rksponse to coercion, responsibility belongs primarily 
to-0, the source of the coercion.. Thus praiseworthy action performed 
in response to coercion, which Heider does not discuss, is presumably 
attributed primarily to 0.  Perhaps the most common example of such 
an action would be a child's response to orders from an adult. Commonly, 
in such situations, the child is praised more for obedience itself than 
for the action performed. Blameworthy action, in contrast, falls 
under both moral and legal constraints. As Heider and the legal system 
agree, the extent of coercion and the ability of the average person 
to resist it determine the extent to which a blameworthy action is 
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attrebuted to.0 or P. Yet'a person is still legally responsible for 
actions performed'under'duress; coercion 3s a mitigation, not a justifi- 
cation. Thus the actor shares the blame for a blameworthy act even 
though primary responsibility rests with 0. 
Action in response to ought is still more complex. In an action 
worthy of praise, we are likely to focus primarily on the person per- 
forming the act -- and the more so, to the extent that his actions clearly 
exceed duty and.are seen to flow from a true internalization of ought. 
On the other hand,.ari action'worthy of blame done because one ought to do 
'it - Es seemingly a paradox, a contradiction in terms. Yet it is also our 
crime of obedience. It should be pointed out that generally, to be 
consistent, we would not expect the same person to hold both the "blame" 
vfew and the "ought" view (cf. Abelson et al., 1968, on cognitive con- 
sistency). An observer could potentially have one of three reactions: 
to perceive the action as blameworthy and deny the motivation of ought; 
to perceive the action as obligatory and, because it is obligatory, deny 
that it is blameworthy; or to perceive both that the action is blame- 
worthy and that the actor saw it as obligatory. Because the third view 
should be both more difficult to hold and difficult to resolve, we would 
expect observers to gravitate toward one of the other two positions. The 
lessons of history and law also suggest that a sizeable proportion of 
observers would tend to focus on the obligation, the motive for action, 
rather than on the blameworthy act itself. If so, this is an exception 
to the general view in psychology and law that effects dominate intentions. 
A crime originating in an authority's order involves both obligation 
and potential coercion. Thus, primary responsibility for a blameworthy 
action-should certainly rest with.the authority.in the view of most 
observers. Historically, in military law, we have seen that the authority 
was ffrst assigned all blame for such an action.' Even in military law 
today, safeguards clearly restrict the subordinate's liability. We can 
expect, then, that primary responsibility will still be attributed by most 
observers to the superior in a crime of obedience. Focusing on either 
the coercion or the obligation involved would dictate such an outcome. 
We can see that the responsibility attributed to the subordinate, the 
person acting, will be a function of the extent to which the attributor 
focuses on (a) the actor's intended causation of a blameworthy act or 
(b) the coercion and obligation which motivated him. 
This analysis has focused on attribution by an observer of an 
action; but a person may also evaluate his own acts. To understand the 
actual commission of crimes of obedience, we should also ask how an 
actor's attribution of responsibility might differ from the disinterested 
observer's attribution. Two lines of thinking on this point converge. 
Piaget (1965) has argued that children develop a sense of subjective 
responsibility, a sensitivity to intentions and motives, earlier toward 
themselves than toward others. In addition, Jones and Nisbett (1971) 
assert that, generally, actors tend to attribute causes of their actions 
more often to the environment, while observers tend to attribute causality 
more often to the actor. In the case of coercion and obligation, which 
are interpersonal forces, these analyses converge. The actor would be 
more sensitive both to his motives for acting (Piaget) and to their source 
in the environment or social order (Jones and Nisbett). Particularly in 
the case of a blameworthy action, we can see how a discrepancy could 
appear between attributions by an actor (such as a military subordinate) 
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and a  dfs i ;n te res ted 'obser+er  ( such  a s  a  judge o r  j u r y ) .  When a blame- 
worthy ac tgon  was mot iva t ed 'by ' coe rc ion  o r  o b l i g a t i o n ,  an a c t o r  could  
fTnd i t  easy  t o  avoid self-blame by focus ing  on t h e  impetus f o r  t h e  a c t .  
An observer  could more e a s i l y  blame t h e  a c t o r ,  s i n c e  a c t i o n s  and t h e i r  
e f f e c t s  g e n e r a l l y  dominate i n t e n t i o n s  i n  perce iv ing  o t h e r s .  However, we 
h e  seen  t h a t  t h e  observer  could p l a u s i b l y  focus  on e i t h e r  t h e  a c t i o n s  
o r  t h e  mot iva t ions  of t h e  subord ina t e ,  and t h e r e  a r e  s t r o n g  reasons t o  
b e l i e v e  t h a t  many observers  would a l s o  r e l i e v e  t h e  a c t o r  of blame. 
This  p o t e n t i a l  divergence between obse rve r s  w a s  demonstrated i n  a 
survey i n v e s t i g a t i o n  of p u b l i c  r e a c t i o n s  t o  t h e  t r i a l  of Lt .  Cal ley  f o r  
t h e  My L a i  massacre (Kelman and Lawrence [Hamilton],  1972a, b ;  Kelman 
and Hamilton, 1974; Lawrence and Kelman, 1973).  The au tho r s  i d e n t i f i e d  
two major groups i n  t h e  n a t i o n a l  popu la t ion  on t h e  b a s i s  of t h e i r  a t t r i -  
bu t ions :  one group who approved of t h e  t r i a l  on t h e  b a s i s  of i n d i v i d u a l  
r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  (AR group);  and a  second group who disapproved of t h e  
t r i a l  because they  viewed a u t h o r i t i e s  as r e spons ib l e  f o r  subordinates , '  
a c t s  (DR group).  It appeared t h a t ,  indeed,  t h e  ques t ion  mark i n  our  
diagram was be ing  f i l l e d  a s  we suggested above. The AR group, focusing 
on t h e  blameworthy consequences of C a l l e y ' s  a c t i o n s ,  denied t h a t  they 
were o b l i g a t o r y .  The DR group, focus ing  on t h e  subord ina t e ' s  du ty  (and 
compulsion) t o  obey, d i d  n o t  a l l  f u l l y  condone t h e  actions--but neverthe--- 
l e s s  agreed t h a t  Cal ley  should n o t  have been brought t o  t r i a l  f o r  them. 
Thus i t  appears  t h a t  observers  may r e s o l v e  t h e  "paradox" by r e t a i n i n g  t h e  
normal a t t r i b u t i o n  framework on t h e  one hand ( i . e . ,  focusing on t h e  consequences 
and a t t r i b u t i n g  pe r sona l  c a u s a l i t y  t o  t h e  proximate cause) o r  by s h i f t i n g  
t o  a n  "author i ty"  framework on t h e  o t h e r  ( focus ing  on t h e  coerc ion  and 
o b l i g a t i o n  t h a t  l e d  t o  t h e  a c t i o n . )  
Y e t  t h e  Kelman and Hamilton d i s c u s s i o n  of AR and DR p a t t e r n s  of re -  
sponse suggests  a f u r t h e r  compl ica t ion  and f u r t h e r  weakness i n  Heiderian 
a t t r i b u t i o n  i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s  of such s i t u a t i o n s .  A s  they d e s c r i b e  t h e  
p a t t e r n s  of response:  
The da t a . . . r evea l  some s t r i k i n g  d i f f e r e n c e s  between t h e  AR and DR 
groups i n  t h e i r  d e f i n i t i o n s  of t h e  s i t u a t i o n  i n  which Cal ley  found 
himself .  The DR respondents  tend  t o  f e e l  t h a t  Cal ley  should have 
c a r r i e d  ou t  o r d e r s  t o  shoot  c i v i l i a n s ,  t h a t  most people would fo l low 
such o r d e r s  i n  a  similar s i t u a t i o n ,  t h a t  they  themselves would do 
so ,  and t h a t  C a l l e y ' s  a c t i o n  w a s  r i gh t - - tha t  he  w a s  doing what any 
good s o l d i e r  would do under t h e  circumstances.  They a r e  prepared t o  
accept  va r ious  j u s t i f i c a t i o n s  f o r  h i s  a c t i o n ,  and they s e e  i t  a s  no 
d i f f e r e n t  from bombing r a i d s ,  which a l s o  k i l l  c i v i l i a n s .  They s e e  
Cal ley  a s  a s o l d i e r  doing h i s  duty.  The AR respondents ,  on t h e  
o t h e r  hand, tend t o  f e e l  t h a t  Ca l l ey  should have re fused  t o  c a r r y  
ou t  o r d e r s  t o  shoot  c i v i l i a n s ,  t h a t  most people would r e f u s e  t o  
shoot  i n  a  s i m i l a r  s i t u a t i o n ,  t h a t  they  themselves would r e f u s e  
t o  do so ,  and t h a t  Ca l l ey ' s  a c t i o n  was wrong--that i t  v i o l a t e d  
p r i n c i p l e s  of mora l i t y .  They a r e  n o t  prepared t o  accept  v a r i o u s  
j u s t i f i c a t i o n s  f o r  h i s  a c t i o n ,  and they  s e e  it  a s  q u i t e  d i f f e r e n t  
from bombing r a i d s  i n  which t h e  k i l l i n g  of c i v i l i a n s  is q u i t e  
un in t en t iona l .  They s e e  C a l l e y ' s  a c t i o n  a s  pe r sona l ly  caused and 
i n s i s t  on h i s  i n d i v i d u a l  r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  i n  terms of t h e  u s u a l  moral 
s tandards  ... They hold a  person r e s p o n s i b l e  f o r  t h e  d i r e c t  and intended 
consequences of a c t i o n s  i n  which he  seems a b l e  t o  e x e r c i s e  personal  
choice  ...( Kelman &Lawrence, 1972b, p. 198) , 
These d a t a  suggest  a  fundamental ques t ion  f o r  a t t r i b u t i o n  theory:  Howv is  
it t h a t  people i n i t i a l l y  dec ide  what happened and what t h e  consequences of 
t h e  event  were? A t t r i b u t i o n  t h e o r i s t s  have gene ra l ly  focused on an  
I 
event  o r  an1 ac t ion tand  asked what i ts  perceived causes were. They have n o t  
adequate ly  addressed t h e  p r i o r  q u e s t i o n ,  which has f o r  decades been a 
c e n t r a l  i s s u e  i n  sociology:  what happened? Ranging from W.I. Thomas' 
(1928) concept of t h e  d e f i n i t i o n  of t h e  s i t u a t i o n  through modern symbolic 
i n t e rac t ion i sm,  t h e  s o c i o l o g i c a l  argument has  been c l e a r :  w i t h i n  c e r t a i n  
broad l i m i t s ,  r e a l i t y  is  s o c i a l l y  def ined .  What t h i s  impl ies  f o r  a t t r i b u t i o n  
processes  i s  t h a t  people should o f t e n  d i f f e r ,  n o t  simply i n  what they  say 
caused an event ,  bu t  a l s o  i n  what they  say  t h e  event  was. 
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Although t h e i r  da ta  on t h i s  point  a r e  i n d i r e c t ,  t h e  Kelman-Hamilton 
study suggests  t h a t  t h e r e  may be two ways of descr ib ing "wkat happened" 
i n  t h e  My Lai  events  and t h e i r  consequences. One could say t h a t  unarmed 
human beings w e r e  shot  and k i l l e d ;  t h i s  statement we could c a l l  t he  
"physical f ac t s . "  One could a l s o  say t h a t  o rde r s  t o  k i l l  suspected 
enemy were followed; t h i s ,  a t  l e a s t  f o r  some observers,  we could c a l l  t he  
11 s o c i a l  f ac t s . "  Thus t h e  AR and DR respondents were p o t e n t i a l l y  judging 
two d i f f e r e n t  s i t u a t i o n s ,  t h e  physica l  and the  s o c i a l .  It would be 
cons i s t en t  with t h e  AR p a t t e r n  t o  argue t h a t  they were focusing on the  
"physical f a c t "  s i t u a t i o n  and using t h e  normal Heiderian a t t r i b u t i o n  
processes t o  judge i t .  I n  c o n t r a s t ,  DR respondents appeared t o  focus on 
the  " soc ia l  f a c t "  s i t u a t i o n  and judge i t  i n  the  l i g h t  of t h e  motives t h a t  
a u t h o r i t a t i v e  o rde r s  e l i c i t .  I n  the  AR vers ion ,  one would descr ibe  t h e  
a c t i o n  and i t s  consequence a s  " k i l l i n g  people"; i n  t h e  DRY "following 
orders  t o  k i l l  enemy." Going back one s t e p ,  following t h e  Jones and 
Davis model, the  groups would a l s o  i n f e r  in ten t ions  d i f f e r e n t l y .  An AR 
respondent could say t h a t  Calley intended t o  k i l l  people when he shot ;  a 
DR respondent could say t h a t  he intended t o  follow orders .  Neither s t a t e - -  
ment is necessa r i ly  f a l s e .  "Reality"--including i n t e n t i o n s ,  ac t ions ,  
and consequences--exists on severa l  l e v e l s  and i n  s e v e r a l  competing 
vers ions .  
Returning t o  our diagram of how an observer a l l o c a t e s  r e s p o n s i b i l i t y ,  
then, w e  s e e  t h a t  t h e  "paradox" may we l l  be resolved before  t h e  normal 
a t t r i b u t i o n  process is even entered:  observers may simply decide t h a t  
d i f f e r e n t  "things" happened. I f  they decide t h a t  one th ing happened i n  
our crime of obedience, they a t t r i b u t e  r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  i n  t h e  "normal" 
way, i n f e r r i n g  i n t e n t  from consequences and assess ing  blame accordingly. 
If they decide that another thing happened, they respond instead to 
societal pressures perceived both internal and external to the actor, 
pressures that release him from responsibility because he lacked mens 
rea. -
A final reason Uhy the crime of obedience is interesting and trouble- 
some for both the attribution theorist and the lawyer is that, in calling 
up the conflict between consequences and motive--or, more dramatically, 
between different definitions of the situation--it reminds us of the 
ambiguity of mens rea itself. Arendt (1964) has addressed this issue most --
persuasively in Eichmann in Jerusalem: A Report on the Banality of Evil. - - -- -- 
Her subtitle is the central issue here: she argues that bureaucratic 
evildoing is essentially banal in that it lacks evil intent. Thus 
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Eichmann did not intend to "do wrong," or to violate international law; 
he intended to "follow orders." She ultimately makes what for the attribu- 
tionist is a familiar argument: when the consequences are severe enough, 
we infer malice aforethought despite absence of evidence that it was 
truly malicious. Thus she lays out a challenge to modern legal systems: 
Foremost among the larger issues at stake in the Eichmann trial 
was the assumption current in all modern legal systems that intent 
to do wrong is necessary for the commission of a crime...We refuse, 
and consider as barbaric, the proposition that "a great crime offends 
nature, so that the very earth cries out for vengeance...w. And yet I 
think it is undeniable that it was precisely on the ground of these 
long-forgotten propositions that Eichmann was brought to justice to 
begin with, and that they were, in fact, the supreme justification 
for the death penalty ...(p. 277) 
Although we may agree with her argument that mens rea in the theoretical --
sense is missing in such cases, we can still assert that mens rea as it --
is normally used in practice remains. Yet Arendt forcefully reminds us 
that intent to follow orders is not normally a blameworthy thing. 
In summary, the crime of obedience presents attribution theory and 
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law with several problems: divergence between the ought motive and the 
blameworthy consequence; the interplay among intention, action, and 
consequence such that different definitions of the situation may lead to 
radically different attributions; and the possible presence of mens rea --
without malice. We suggest that it is vital to incorporate such sociologi- 
cal concepts as Mead's generalized other and Thomas' definition of the 
situation in order to adequately handle the presence of moral reasons 
for doing wrong. 
Conclusions 
We have explored gaps in current social psychological theories 
concerning responsibility attribution by discussing three possible paradoxes: 
%.. 
First, can we have responsibility w%thout blame? Second, can an authority be 
both more and less responsible than a subordinate for actions that authority 
orders? Finally, can we sensibly discuss wrongdoing performed because 
of obligation--"crimes of obedience?'' Each of these questions, although 
not proving to be truly paradoxical, highlights weaknesses in our current 
approaches. 
First, our research has focused on levels of responsibility attribution 
and neglected the question of kinds of responsibility. Responsibility, 
except in the purely causal sense, does entail potential blame; yet nuances 
in the meaning of responsibility can have important personal and social 
consequences. Given that societies are hierarchical, a particularly in- 
teresting issue is the relationship between role responsibility and causal 
responsibility: how responsible authorities and actors are for deeds 
performed in a hierarchical setting. 
We argued that a superior was indeed potentially both less and more 
responsible than a subordinate for actions ordered by the superior--but 
t h a t  two senses  of t h e  term " r e s p o n s i b i l i t y "  a r e  involved.  The supe r io r  
is  c l e a r l y  more r o l e  r e spons ib l e .  I n  c o n t r a s t ,  t h e  subord ina te  may be 
perce ived  a s  more c a u s a l l y  r e s p o n s i b l e  because of h i s  Humean proximity 
t o  t h e  a c t ;  i n  a d d i t i o n ,  t o  make c a u s a l  i n fe rences  up a  h i e r a r c h i c a l  
c a u s a l  cha in  may involve  l o g i c a l  a s  w e l l  as phys i ca l  "dis tance" from t h e  
a c t .  For a  number of reasons ,  such c a u s a l  cha ins  p re sen t  both t h e o r e t i c a l  
problems and f a s c i n a t i n g  r e sea rch  p o s s i b i l i t i e s .  
F i n a l l y ,  w e  tu rned  t o  t h e  i s s u e  of how a c t o r  and observer  perce ive  
wrongdoing performed i n  a n  a u t h o r i t y  s e t t i n g :  a  cr ime of obedience. We 
argued t h a t  t h e  subord ina t e  g e n e r a l l y  pe rce ives  r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  a s  r e s t i n g  
wi th  t h e  a u t h o r i t y  because t h e - a u t h o r i t y  possesses  both  t h e  power and 
t h e  r i g h t  t o  command. Heider ' s  d i s c u s s i o n  of command, i t  was noted,  
does not  d e a l  w i th  t h e  most common of commands: t hose  from someone wi th  
a perceived r i g h t  t o  i s s u e  them. It was a l s o  argued t h a t  ought i s  no t  
adequate ly  handled i n  a Heiderian framework: t h a t  i t  should be  t r e a t e d  
as %a t r a n s i t i o n a l  motive, n e i t h e r  f u l l y  e x t e r n a l  no r  f u l l y  i n t e r n a l .  
Observers of a crime of obedience might reasonably focus  on e i t h e r  t h e  
powerful motives f o r  obedience o r  ( a s  i s  t y p i c a l  i n  "normal" a t t r i b u t i o n s )  
on t h e  consequences of t h e  obedience. Resu l t s  from one s tudy of such 
observers  sugges ts  t h a t  i n d i v i d u a l s  may d i f f e r  i n  how they d e f i n e  t h e  
s i t u a t i o n  i t s e l f  a s  w e l l  a s  i n  how they  make a t t r i b u t i o n s  wi th in  i t .  One 
can d e s c r i b e  t h e  same s i t u a t i o n  q u i t e  d i f f e r e n t l y  by emphasizing what 
were l abe l ed  he re  a s  "phys ica l  f a c t s "  and " s o c i a l  f a c t s . "  Such a  crime 
thus  h i g h l i g h t s  weaknesses i n  s o c i a l  p sycho log i s t s '  understanding of 
"ought"; i n  our  handl ing of t h e  i n t e r p l a y  between i n t e n t  and consequence; 
and i n  our  concept ion of t h e  d e f i n i t i o n  of t h e  s i t u a t i o n .  An adequate 
g ra sp  of t h e s e  problems would enable  u s  t o  e x p l a i n  as w e l l  a s  t o  a s s e r t  
that. the "banality. of w2l" 2s no paradox.. ' 
Tundamentally, socfal pspcFiolog~cal attrj$uti!on tfieorfes have not 
Encorporated a number of potent5al lessons f.~orn socMlogp and law. Milgram 
(1967) has argued'that "perhaps tRe-.most far-reachfng consequence of 
submQssion to a system of authorety is tFie diknfnution of the sense of 
responstB212tp . . ." (p. 1. Because soc2al structure is hierarchical -- 
because we'lkve En a wo~ld of autbrEtTes, norms, and obligations as 
well as powerful others and situatfonal forces -- it is vital to examine 
responsibtlity in a social context. What responsibility itself means, 
@ien we are responsQble for our actfons, and how we even define social 
s,AtuatQons are all questtons raised by consfderation of responsibility 
in the authority-actor relatfonshfp. A final, paradoxical lesson may 
emerge from such study: to the extent that we better understand 
authoritative constraints on our responsibflity for what we do, we may 
be able to enlarge that responsibility. 
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